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RECENT CASES
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - INJURY IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
-NECESSITY FOR CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN INJURY AND EMPLOYMENT
The claimant, while on duty as a restaurant waitress, was shot and severely
injured by a customer who had just been served by another waitress.
The customer immediately committed suicide. No mention of motive for
the shooting appeared in the opinion. The North Dakota Court held, that
the shooting was an injury arising in the course of employment and there-
fore compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Lippman v.
North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 55 N.W.2d 453 (N.D.
1952).
With this decision North Dakota assumes a unique postion of liber-
ality in definition of a compensable injury. Cases of employees claim-
ing workmen's compensation for assaults by fellow employees or third
persons abound in the reports, but none other has been found where recov-
ery was allowed without some, however slight, connection shown between
the employment and the injury. The case is defensible because the North
Dakota Workmen's Compensation Act covers any injury "arising in the
course of employment." ' Statutes in almost all other states 2 require not
only that the injury arise "in the course of' the employment, but also
that it "arise out of" the employment,3 thus imposing a dual standard.
An injury arises in the course of employment if it happens during work
hours, at any place where the purpose of work may lead the employee4
while he is engaged in any activity reasonably contemplated 5 by the
employment. This requirement relates to time, place, and occupation.
6
Late cases are extremely liberal in defining "course of employment."7
Not so easily established, however, is the second generally indispensable
element, that the injury "arise out of" the employment. An injury arising
out of the employment is one deriving its cause, origin, or source from
some incident, condition, or risk identified with the employment 8 There
1. N.D. Rev. Code §65-0102 (8) (Supp. 1949). "'Injury' shall mean only an
injury arising in the course of employment including an injury caused by the willful act
of a third person directed against an employee because of his employment ....
2. Mr. Justice Minton was apparently contemplating a case such as the instant
decision when he wrote: "Liability accrues . . . only if the death arose out of and in
the course of the employment. This is a statutory provision common to all Workmen's
Compensation Acts." O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U.S. 504, 509 (1951)
(dissenting opinion ); Prosser, Torts 528 (1941).
3. For an exhaustive general discussion see 6 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation
Text §1542 (1948).
4. Robbins v. Yellow Cab. Co., 85 Cal. App.2d 811, 193 P.2d 956, 958 (1948),
"The employee must be engaged in the work he has been hired to perform; it must
occur within the period of his employment and at a place where he may reasonably
be for that purpose while engaged in the performance of his duties."
5. Nugent Sand Co. v. Hargesheimer, 254 Ky. 358, 71 S.W.2d 647 (1934)
(employee bitten while away from usual working place at employer's request held covered
by Workmen's Compensation Act).
6. See Hanson v. Robitshek-Schneider Co., 209 Minn. 596, 297 N.W. 19, 21
(1941); M & K Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132,
134 (1948). Utah, like North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas and Washington, requires
only a showing that the injury arose in the course of employment. 6 Schneider, Work-
men's Compensation Text §1542 n. 1 (1948).
7. E.g., Strauss v. Industrial Commission, 73 Ariz. 285, 240 P.2d 550 (1952)
(any act "reasonably contemplated" by employment included); State Employees' Retire-
ment System v. Industrial Accident Commission, 97 Cal.App.2d 380, 217 P.2d 992
(1952) (game warden asphyxiated with paramour in bed-equipped state car in wooded
area, held within employment). But cf. Central Garage of LaSalle v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 286 Ill. 291, 121 N.E. 587 (1918) (illustrative of strict requirement in older cases).
8. Mailloux' Case, 105 N.E.2d 223 (Mass. 1952) (no recovery, risk not incidental
to or connected with employment); Prosser, Torts 533 (1941).
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must be a causal connection between the job and the injury.9 The
employment need not cause the injury in the sense of being a direct
or proximate cause, but it must be a contributing factor 10 so that the
injury may fairly be compensated as the legitimate fruitage of the em-
ployment." The court in the instant case refused to distort the plain
statutory language to include this nearly universal dual standard, but
allowed recovery without any proof of causal connection between the em-
ployment and the injury.
Similar statutes have been otherwise interpreted." The Ohio court
construed the words "in the course of employment" as including by im-
plication the complementary phrase "arise out of" and applied the dual
standard requiring causal connection.1 3  Intimating that recovery on a
mere showing that the injury happened "in the course of" employment
would be an unconstitutional contravention of the employer's rights, the
court's decision apparently induced the legislature to amend the law
in conformity with the dual standard.14 Since the amendment, the re-
quirement of causal connection has not been interpreted strictly in Ohio,
and recovery has not been precluded in willful assault situations com-
parable to the instant case. i5 In Pennsylvania, where the statute allows
recovery for injuries suffered "in the course of" employment, the injury
need not grow out of the employment. 16 However, no willful assault is
compensable if directed at the employee for personal reasons, and not
for any motive connected with his employment. 1 In willful assault cases
the Pennsylvania courts require the defendant employer to sustain the
burden of proving the motive was personal in order to defeat recovery.' 8
The North Dakota statute applied in the main case includes as com-
pensable "an injury caused by the willful act of a third person because
of his employment." 19 The defendant contended that the phrase "be-
cause of his employment" required the claimant to prove the assault was
prompted by some provocation connected with the employment. The court
9. "There must be some connection between the death and the employment. Not
in any common law sense of causal connection but in the common-sense, everyday,
realistic view." O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U.S. 504, 509 (1951) (dissenting
opinion).
10. Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 62 Ariz. 398, 158 P.2d 511
(1945) (explosion of cola bottle brought on employer's premises by claimant hel4
compensable), see Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719, 728 (19497
(waitress shot by spring gun burglar alarm).
11. Howard v. Dawkins Log & Mill Co., 284 Ky. 9, 143 S.W.2d 741, 743 (1940):
"Compensation should be allowed for all such injuries inflicted by third persons
when the cause . . . sprouted from the performance of the servant's duties.
12. See 27 Tex. L. Rev. 571 (1949).
13. Fassig v. State, 95 Ohio St. 232, 116 N.E. 104 (1917), see industrial
Commission v. Weigandt, 102 Ohio St. 1, 130 N.E. 38, 39 (1921).
14. Ohio Gen. Code §1465-37 et seq.; See, Malone v. Industrial Commission,
140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N.E.2d 266, 269 (1922) (Summary of Legislative History).
15. Huston v. Industrial Commission, 87 Ohio App. 33, 85 N.E.2d 531 (1949)
(cab driver-manager shot while resisting restaurant holdup; rocovery allowed).
16. See Hunter v. American Oil Co., 136 Pa. Super. 563, 7 A.2d 479, 483
(1939) (employee's body found in river, neither murder nor suicide being proven; held,
compensable).
17. Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act §411: "The term 'injury by an
accident in the course of his employment,' as used in this article, shall not include an
injury caused by an act of a third person intended to injure the employee because of
reasons personal to him, and not directed against him as an employee or because of his
employment."
18. See note 16 supra.
19. N.D. Rev. Code §65-0102 (Supp. 1949). (Italics added).
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considered this claim unfounded..-0 Construing an identical phrase, the
Mississippi court, just four months earlier, reached a directly contrary
result, holding the words "because of his employment" to impose a distinct
requirement that the claimant in an assault case show a causal connection
between the willful act and the employment.2 1 Since newspaper accounts
of the shooting leading up to the instant North Dakota case described
the assailant as a former suitor of the injured waitress, 22 it is remarkable
that the court made no mention of the probability that the shooting was
induced by a personal motive entirely unconnected with the employment.
In other states the rule is well established that an assault induced
solely by personal ill will is not compensable 2: because not traceable
to risks incidental to the employment,24 but attributable to animosity likely
to assert itself at any time and in any place. 25 It makes no difference that the
assault is perpetrated by a fellow employee 26 while both victim and
assailant are at work 27 because the test is whether the motive is purely
personal or is business inspired. If the assault is committed because of
personal anger, hatred, revenge, or lust 28 entirely foreign to the employ-
ment, the injury is generally treated as the independent act of the assail-
ant and not one arising out of the employment. 29 These courts refuse
to pervert the theory underlying workmen's compensation by character-
20. See Lippman v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 55 N.W.2d
453, 549 (N.D. 1952).
21. Brookhaven Steam Laundry v. Watts, 59 So.2d 294 (Miss. 1952) (laundry
delivery man shot by customer while there for joint purposes of picking up cleaning and
furthering illicit affair with customer's wife; the court first awarded compensation but
thereafter reversed itself).
22. Grand Forks Herald, Nov. 1, 1952, page 10. (Morning Ed.); cf. Rocky Mountain
Fuel Co. v. Kruzic, 94 Colo. 398, 30 P.2d 868 (1934) (award denied where claimant
failed to show motive of shooting, the court commenting that the case was singularly
lacking in evidence that apparently could have been produced).
23. Goodland v. L.S. Donaldson Co., 227 Minn. 583, 36 N.W.2d 4 (1949) (truck-
driver excited personal animosity of motorman by insulting remarks); Brookhaven Steam
Laundry v. Watts, 59 So.2d 294 (Miss. 1952) (love triangle); Ramos v. Taxi Transit
Co., 276 App. Div. 101, 92 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1949) (cab driver murdered by wife's former
rejected suitor); cf. Royal Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 192 Cal.
675, 221 Pac. 371 (1923) (chauffeur shot by cook who committed suicide, refused
award though no specific personal motive appeared).
24. Harden v. Thomasville Furniture Co., 199 N.C. 733, 155 S.E. 728 (1930)
(watchman shot by off duty employee because of personal domestic troubles, held, injury
was noncompensable); Hopson v. Hungerford Coal Co., 187 Va. 299, 46 S.E.2d 392
(1948) (employee killed by asylum escapee; claimant failed to prove connection with
employment).
25. Bridges v. Elite, Inc., 212 S.C. 514, 48 S.E.2d 497, 499 (1948). In this
case a restaurant waitress was shot by a spurned lover who immediately killed himself.
The court stated: "The fact that she met her violent death on the employer's premises
was purely coincidental. The conclusion is inescapable that Smawley intended to kill
Eula May Bridges whenever and wherever he met her. She was not exposed to his
attack by anything connected with her employment. No other employee was subject to
the hazard which confronted her. The causative danger was peculiar to her and not to
her work." On its facts this case appears directly contra to the principal decision.
26. Cyrus v. Miller Tire Service, 208 S.C. 545, 38 S.E.2d 761 (1946) (fatal dispute
over three cents); American General Ins. Co. v. Williams, 32 Tex. App. 683, 227
S.W.2d 788 (1950) (killing arose from crap game scuffle).
27. Scholtzhauer v. C. & L. Lunch Co., 233 N.Y. 12, 134 N.E. 701 (1922)
(waitress 9hot by dishwasher after refusing "date"); Elrod v. Union Bleachery, 204
S.r 481, 30 S.E.2d 73 (1944) (decedent clubbed to death for flirting with co-worker's
wife).
28. State v. District Court, 140 Minn. 470, 168 N.W. 555 (1918) (county
schoolteacher raped). But cf. Giracelli v. Franklin Cleaners & Dyers, 132 N.J.L. 590,
42 A.2d 3 (1945) (rape of salesgirl left alone in building compensable).
29. Harden v. Thomsville Furniture Co., 199 N.C. 733, 155 S.E. 728 (1930)
(shooting entirely foreign to employment).
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izing personal revenge for private reasons as an industrial risk.30 Excep-
tional is the case where the employer knows of the personal enmity and
in spite of that knowledge exposes the employee to special danger of the
assault. An employer who so endangers his employee is held liable.3'
Even in cases where no motive for the assault is shown, as in the
instant case, most courts have refused recovery 32 basing denial on the
claimant's failure to demonstrate a causal relation justifying the infer-
ence that the injury arose out of the employment33 Some courts base
an exception in favor of night watchmen murdered for no ascertainable
motive upon the lonely nature of the job and its inherent dangers to the
employee.3 4 In contrast to cases denying recovery where no motive for
the assault appears are those allowing recovery where an employee at
work in a public place is assaulted by an insane person. 35 The rationale
of these latter decisions is that working in a public place requires the
employee to expose himself to all types of people, including the insane.
Actually the courts have applied what may be termed a "but for" test,
reasoning that the employee would not have been present at the place
where the insane person struck, were it not for the employment.
36  It
would appear more logically consistent to deny recovery where no rational
motive appears if recovery is to be denied where no motive whatever appears.
3 7
If the claimant can demonstrate that the circumstances or environ-
ment of the employment increased the likelihood of an assault, his injuries
arc generally compensable, although the motive may be clearly personal3 8
Sufficient causal relation is established by showing that some incident
of the employment provided the assailant an unusual opportunity to strike
without risk of apprehension.39 But if the employee himself contributes
30. See Ramos v. Taxi Transit Co., 276 App. Div. 101, 92 N.Y.S.2d 744, 751
(1941) (grudge shooting).
31. Berrisi v. Ryan 242 App. Div. 279, 275 N.Y.S. 370 (1934) (employer
deliberately increased peril).
32. Ries v. De Bord Plumbing Co., 186 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. App. 1945) (assault
by unknown assailant for reason never discovered); Coco v. Wilbur, 104 N.J.L. 275,
140 Atl. 790 (1928) (berry picker shot by unknown killer).
33. Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. v. Kruzic, 94 Colo. 398, 30 P.2d 868 (1934);
Giles v. W.E. Beverage Corp., 133 N.J.L. 137, 43 A.2d 286 (1945) (liquor store
manager shot counting day's receipts but nothing stolen); cf. Brown v. General Drivers
Union No. 544, 212 Minn. 265, 3 N.W.2d 423 (1942) (failure to connect union leader's
murder with job hazard).
34. Cole v. I. Lewis Cigar Mfg. Co., 3 N.J. 40, 68 A.2d 737 (1949) (only property
stolen was murdered watchman's money); Rathburn v. Sussman Brothers & Co., 127
Pa. Super. 104, 193 Atl. 488 (1937) (watchman shot in attempt to rob him). Contra:
Howard v. Dawkins Log & Mill Co., 284 Ky. 9, 143 S.W.2d 741 (1940) (no motive
revealed).
35. Louie v. Bamboo Gardens, 67 Idaho 469, 185 P.2d 712 (1947) (dishwasher
shot because of assailant's insane delusion); Katz v. A. Kadans & Co., 232 N.Y.'420,
134 N. E. 330 (1922) (stabbing by insane man compensable as street risk).
36. See Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Hoage, 85 F.2d 417, 418 (App.D.C.
1936) (crazed stranger knifed cook in restaurant); accord, London Guarantee & Accident
Co. v. McCoy, 97 Colo. 13, 45 P.2d 900 (1935) (applied "but for" test where employee
went to insane man's home to make business telephone call).
37. Cf. Hopson v. Hungerford Coal Co., 187 Va. 299, 46 S.E.2d 392 (1948)
(failure to connect insane attack to employment prevented recovery).
38. Robertz v. Board of Education, 134 N.J.L. 444, 48 A.2d 847 (1946)
(teacher assaulted leaving night meeting of student club, held that night services as
faculty advisor increased hazard); Huston v. Industrial Commission, 87 Ohio App. 33,
85 N.E.2d 531, 532, (1949). "There was causal connection . . . through the activities,
conditions, and environments of the employment."
39. Hanson v. Robitshek-Schneider Co., 209 Minn. 596, 297 N.W. 19 (1941)
(salesman attacked leaving night work in area of city where crime was prevalent, motive
personal robbery).
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to increasing the hazard of the attack, recovery may be refused.4 ° Clearly
compensable are assaults originating in disputes concerning the employer's
business or the employee's duties. 4 1  Indeed compensation has been award-
ed where the assault was motivated by a mixture of personal grudge and
employment difficulties.
4 -
These cases illustrate the metamorphic development of modern liber-
ality which finds recovery taken for granted today in cases where no award
would have been possible only twenty-five years ago.4 3 This broadened
viewpoint was acknowledged in a recent Calif6rnia case involving a bar
maid shot by an irate wife who intended to shoot her husband but missed
the mark. 44 Although the present decision may be criticized as compel-
ling an employer to insure his employees against every risk of life,4 5 the
opinion presents a sound legal interpretation of the standard implied in
the statutory phrase "course of employment." The rule deducible is that
no proof of causal connection between employment and injury is requisite
to recovery. If causal connection is to be a qualification for recovery in
North Dakota, as in other states, the change must come from the legisla-
ture. Absent legislative intervention North Dakota's definition of compens-
able injury must be ranked among the most liberal in an era of liberality.
JIM R. CARRIcAN
40. Hopper v. Koenigstein, 135 Neb. 837, 284 N.W. 346 (1939) (compensation
refused where employee drank with man who finally killed him, intoxication increased the
hazard). This case -seems inconsistent with the basic purpose underlyinig workmen's
compensation statutes, since the statutes were intended to contravene the defenses
of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the negligence of a fellow servant.
41. Kentucky Flourspar.Co. v. Wolford, 262 Ky. 471, 92 S.W.2d 753 (1936);
Grant v. Grant Casket Co., 137 N.J.L. 463, 60 A.2d 817 (1948) (labor relations manager
assaulted by union officer who resented management policy); Sanders v. Jarka Corp.,
I N.J. 36, 61 A.2d 641 (1948) (post-accident argument incited assault of truckdriver);
Anderson v. Hotel Cataract, 70 S.D. 376, 17 N.W.2d 913 (1945) (co-employee's
disparagement of decedent's work led to fight).
42. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hughes, 238 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. 1951)
(combined employment jealousy and personal enmity); see Perez v. Fred Harvey, Inc.,
54 N.M. 339, 224 P.2d 524, 526 (1950).
43. Cf. Royal Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 192 Cal. 675,
221 Pac. 371 (1923). (chauffeur sent to investigate noises killed by cook); Mercantile
Commercial Bank v. Koch, 83 Ind. App. 707, 150 N.E. 25 (1925) (stockholder-employee
killed for inducing discharge of murderer's sister).
44. Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 95 Cal. App.2d
443, 214 P.2d 41 (1950); ef. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Barden, 79 Ga. App. 260,
54 S.E.2d 443 (1949) (car hop accidentally shot in transaction personal to another
employee, held, compensable).
45. See Tweten v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 69 N.D. 369,
380, 287 N.W. 310 (1939), "The Workmen's Compensation Act does not provide for
general health insurance or for general accident insurance." See also Prosser, Torts 533
(1941), "But the strict liability imposed by worlnen's compensation never was intended
to provide general health or accident insurance against such events. Its purpose is
limited to protection against the risks of the employment."
